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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL VERBURG, : DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Petitioner, : Appeal No. 20080139 
vs. : Labor Commission No. 04-1130 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION and : 
OGDEN CITY POLICE Priority 7 
DEPARTMENT, 
Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
MICHAEL VERBURG (EMPLOYEE) 
JURISDICTION 
This Petition for Review seeks review of the Final Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration of the Commission entered January 14, 2008, as well as the underlying 
Order Reversing ALLs Decision and Denying Benefits, dated November 19, 2007, as 
referenced therein, which Order denied benefits to Employee, Michael Verburg, based on 
his June 17, 2004 industrial accident, contrary to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order by the Administrative Law Judge dated October 6, 2005. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues on this appeal are three-fold: (1) Whether the Labor Commission erred 
in its application of the Allen" test for "Legal Causation" to the unexpected occurrence of 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah, 1986) 
Employee striking his head against the car door jamb; (2) Whether the Labor Commission 
erred in rendering its medical conclusion that Employee's vision "going black" for a 
moment was related to his preexisting cervical problems, a conclusion not supported by 
the medical records; and (3) Whether the Labor Commission erred in considering the 
issue of "Medical Causation" of Employee's injury when the sole issue before the ALJ 
was that of "Legal Causation." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review varies in matters involving appeals from the Labor 
Commission. Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are generally 
reviewed for correctness.2 The Appeals Court reviews the legal determinations of the 
Commission under a similar standard, "[CJeding the board no deference as appellate 
courts have 'the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform 
throughout the jurisdiction.'"3 
This Court has similarly declared that, since, "The Allen test is a judicially crafted 
rule that the Commission is in no better position to interpret than this court", whether the 
Commission erroneously interpreted and applied that decision "is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness."4 
2Esquivel v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT 66, 7 P. 3d 777 (Utah, 2000). 
'Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm % 153 P. 3d 179, 181 (Utah, 2007) 
"Acosta v. Labor Comm % 2002 UT App. 67, ^ 10, 44 P. 3d 819 (Utah App., 2002) 
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On the other hand, the standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact has 
been summarized as follows: 
In this case, the Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to 
determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before 
it. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997).. . As such, we must uphold 
the Commission's determination . . . unless the determination exceeds the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion under 63-46b-16(h)(i) of the UAPA. . . . Moreover, we resolve, 
"[a]ny doubt respecting the right of compensation in favor of the injured 
employee.'* £>rafe v. Industrial Comm % 939 P. 2d 177, 182 (Utah, 1997) 
(citation omitted).D 
Finally, the Court reviews Commission rulings in workers compensation cases, 
particularly those that result in a denial of benefits, with a "heightened degree of 
oversight" in order to give effect to the purpose of the act to alleviate hardship on workers 
and their families. As the Court explained in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm 'n: 
We will therefore look closely to assure ourselves that the Commission has 
liberally construed and applied the Act to provide coverage and has 
resolved any doubt respecting the right to compensation in favor of an 
injured employee.6 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1999) provides the basic statutory outline for 
compensability of injuries to employees as follows: 
(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of 
and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury 
5AE Clevite v. Labor Comm 'n, 996 P. 2d 1072, 1074 (Utah App., 2000), cert. den. 
4 P. 3d 1289 (Utah, 2000) 
6Supra, note 3 at 182 
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occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
[benefits] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Employee filed an Application for Hearing with the Commission on December 13, 
2004, claiming entitlement for worker's compensation benefits arising out of two alleged 
industrial accidents which Employee claimed had resulted in his injuries. 
An evidentiary hearing was held on June 7, 2005, before the Honorable Lorrie 
Lima, Administrative Law Judge, at which time Employee voluntarily withdrew his claim 
regarding the injury of March 24, 2004 and proceeded on his claim for the June 17, 2004 
injury. 
Judge Lima entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in this 
matter on October 6, 2005. In that Order, Judge Lima determined that Employee had 
aggravated his preexisting condition on June 17, 2004 when he struck his head while 
attempting to get into his car at the end of a shift. While recognizing that Employee must 
meet the higher burden of "legal causation" under Allen, Judge Lima found that the 
preponderance of the evidence established that Employee had met that higher burden and 
benefits were awarded. 
Employer timely filed a Motion for Review, asserting that Employee's work 
related accident did not satisfy the higher burden of "legal causation" under Allen. The 
Labor Commission granted Employer's Motion for Review and entered its Order 
-4-
Reversing ALJ's Decision and Denying Benefits on November 19. 2007. It based that 
reversal upon its detennination that Employee had failed to establish that the employment 
activity, "involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the * usual wear 
and tear and exertions of nonemployment life"' and that the event complained of was, 
rather, "a relatively routine event in which he bumped his head as he slid into the driver's 
seat." 
On December 5, 2007, Employee timely filed his Motion for Reconsideration of 
the Commission's Order. 
On January 14, 2008, the Commission entered its Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration. 
On February 13, 2008, Employee timely filed his Petition for Review with this 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Employee believes that the following Statement of Facts substantially reflects all 
of the relevant and material facts of this case, as established at the Hearing before the 
Honorable Lorrie Lima, Administrative Law Judge, on June 7, 2005. The majority of 
these were outlined in the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Order of Judge Lima 
dated October 6, 2005,7 and were based upon the undisputed testimony of Employee and 
the medical records: 
7R. (vol. 1) at 00037 
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1. Employee worked for Ogden City as a Community Service Officer8. 
2. Employee had a history of cervical spine problems relating back to November 
of 2002 when an MRI reflected multi-level degenerative disc disease. Due to ongoing 
complaints of pain and headaches, Employee underwent an anterior cervical 
microdiscectomy and fusion at C5-6 and C6-7 levels on December 10, 20029. 
3. Employee underwent an anterior cervical discectomy at C4-5 with 
decompression of the nerve root, and an anterior cervical fusion at C4-5 for degenerative 
disc disease at C4-5 due to multiple levels of degenerative disc disease superimposed on 
post-op changes, on April 19, 2004.10 
4. Following the April 19, 2004 surgery. Employee's neck felt better than before 
the surgery and the pain "pretty much went away." Employee "was quite happy with the 
results.11 
5. Employee was released to return to his regular work on June 8, 200412. His 
doctor's notes on that date state, "Overall he reports that he has had good improvement in 
pain . . . He is not taking any real pain medications at this time."13 
8R. (vol. 3) at 10; R. (vol. 1) at 00038 
9R. (vol. 2) at 054 
10R. (vol. 2) at 054; R. (vol. 1) at 00038 
nR. (vol. 3) at 23; R. (vol. 1) at 00038, 00041 
12R. (vol. 3) at 24; R. (vol. 1) at 00038 
13R. (vol. 2) at 057 
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6. On June 17, 2004, at the conclusion of Employee's work shift, he had to get his 
stuff out of the patrol car, because the officers had to share cars. He was "standing facing 
the front of the car" and his body was in motion from a standing to sitting position as he 
went to "kind of scoot sideways" onto the seat.14 With the force of that momentum, he 
struck his head on the top of the door frame on the right side, "halfway between the 
crown and the top of my head and ear."]i The continuous movement of his body and 
weight added more force to the impact of his head and neck on the door 
jam.16"Everything went black for a couple of seconds" and he "just sat there in the car" 
but he did not believe he was actually unconscious.17 Although there was an indication in 
the medical records that he "hit car door by turning too fast,"18 Employee clarified that the 
injury had occurred as he had testified and that "I didn't do any twisting."19 As it was the 
end of the shift on a Friday, he did not return to work but got the rest of the stuff out of 
the vehicle and went home.20 
7. Employee also described a prior incident in which he had hit his head on a 
garage door, an event which he described as follows: 
14R. (vol. 3) at 25; R. (vol. 1) at 00038, 00041 
]5R. (vol. 3) at 11 - 12; R. (vol. 1) at 00038, 00041 
16R. (vol. 1) at 00041 
17R. (vol. 3) at 12; R. (vol. 1) at 00038 
18R. (vol. 2) at 138 
19R. (vol. 3) at 26 
20R. (vol. 3) at 13; R. (vol. 1) at 00038 
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I didn't really hit it really hard on the garage door. What it was, is about -
there was a walkabout on row on 2nd Street, and I was on a call where a car 
had broke through the lady's garage door and left. And I was responding 
on the hit-and-run call. I guess the car went through the garage door and 
smashed it up and actually hit the car inside the garage and pushed it 
forward. And the garage door was kind of hanging down a little bit, and as 
I went underneath it, I can't - my head doesn't bend as much anymore. I 
just hit - caught my head on the garage door.21 
He went on to explain that, in that prior incident, his vision did not go black and he 
did not have to stop and rest after the incident and "just kept doing my job."22 
8. After the accident of June 17, 2004, Employee initially had no other 
symptoms. However, unlike the prior event with the garage door, about an hour 
afterwards, after he got home, he started having problems.23 His pain progressively 
worsened.24 There was a lot of pain in the center of his neck and pain radiating 
back in his shoulders and, since it was shortly after surgery he was concerned that 
he might have disrupted his fusion..25 
9. When the pain worsened and Employee told his sergeant what had 
happened, he was directed to the emergency room26, where the doctor took him off 
21R. (vol. 3) at 15 
22Id. 
23R. (vol. 3) at 13, 24; R. (vol. 1) at 00038 
24R. (vol. 3) at 16; R. (vol. 1) at 00038, 00041 
25Id. 
26R. (vol. 3) at 17 
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work until he met with his surgeon. After he saw his surgeon, he was taken off 
work until after the surgery and recuperation.27 
10. Employee's doctor's notes on July 13, 2004, reflect, "He states that he 
was doing quite well until he hit his head on a car and states that now he has 
similar pain to what he has had previously, prior to the surgery."28 
11. Although subsequent initial X-rays and evaluation reflected a stable 
fusion and was diagnosed as a muscle strain, pain continued to increase. 
Employee continued to receive treatment and pain medications through June 2, 
2005, when Dr. Brown issued an independent medical evaluation, which noted his 
pre-existing condition and opined a medical nexus between the injury of June 17, 
2004 and the complaints of increased cervical spine pain. He found medical 
treatment through that date was medically necessary due to the industrial injury of 
June 17, 2004 and that further treatment of the condition would include pain 
management for significant neck pain without further surgery.29 
12. Employee was finally released to return to work on January 10, 2005.30 
13. At the commencement of the hearing, Employee noted that there was a 
pre-existing injury and that the issue to be determined "is just going to be legal 
27R. (vol. 3) at 17; R. (vol. 1) at 00038 
28R. (vol. 2) at 059; R. (vol. 1) at 00039 
29R. (vol. 2) at 232 - 233; R. (vol. 1) at 00038 
30R (vol. 3) at 17; R. (vol. 1) at 00039 
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causation,"31 Employer agreed with Employee's indication in that regard and 
confirmed that their contention was that the bump on the head "does not satisfy the 
higher legal causation standard of Allen."32 
14. Following the Hearing, in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order, Judge Lima recognized that, although medical causation was satisfied, 
due to the pre-existing condition of Employee, the more stringent test for "legal 
causation" under Allen, must also be satisfied. In that regard, Judge Lima 
determined: 
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the direct force 
Petitioner experienced moving from a standing to sitting position while 
propelling his body sideways with such a force, that when he struck his 
head his vision went black, was not a typical exertion experienced by men 
and women in modern non-employment life. While getting into a motor 
vehicle is typical of modern non-employment life, such exertion does not 
typically involve the combination of factors presented here. Specifically, 
the continuous movement of Petitioner's body and weight added more force 
to the impact of Petitioner's head and neck on the door jam which was 
unusual and extraordinary and satisfies the requirement of legal causation. 
This extra exertion served to offset the preexisting condition of Petitioner as 
the likely cause of the injury. Moreover, how Petitioner felt before and 
after the [sic] June 17, 2004, evidences the degree offeree exerted by 
Petitioner. Following surgery in April, 2004, Petitioner felt better than 
before the surgery and he was happy with the result. However, following 
June 17, 2004, Petitioner experienced significantly increased pain in his 
cervical spine.33 
31R. (vol. 3) at 6 
32R. (vol. 3) at 7 
33R. (vol. 1) at 00041 (Order is attached as Addendum 1 to this Brief) 
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Judge Lima then determined that Employee's exertion at the time of the accident was 
sufficient to satisfy Allen's higher standard of "legal causation/' 
15. In its Order Reversing ALJ's Decision and Denying Benefits, the Commission 
noted that the parties did not dispute Judge Lima's findings.34 
16. In that Order, the Commission then determined that Allen and its progeny 
declare that, when a claimant suffers from a pre-existing condition such as that of the 
Employee in this case, the claimant must show "that the employment activity involved 
some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the 'usual wear and tear and 
exertions of nonemployment life.'"3:) The Commission declared: 
Usually, the exertion can be easily classified as "unusual or extraordinary" 
and compensable, or "usual and ordinary" and noncompensable. Mr. 
Verburg's exertion is more difficult to characterize because there is no way 
to determine the force with which he hit his head on his car door.36 
17. The Commission went on to declare that the record indicated Mr. Verburg's 
accident "appears to have been a relatively routine event in which he bumped his head as 
he slid into the driver's seat."37 Finally, the Commission concluded: 
The Commission is unconvinced that Mr. Verburg's testimony of his vision 
going dark is a measure of the force of impact. The Commission also notes 
the absence of any evidence of bruising or other marks from the impact. In 
34R. (vol. 1) at 00059 (Order is attached as Addendum 2 to this Brief) 
3SR. (vol. 1) at 00060 
36R. (vol. 1) at 00061 
37Id. 
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summary, the Commission finds that the evidence does not establish that 
the exertion involved in Mr. Verburg's accident was unusual or 
extraordinary.38 
18. On December 5, 2007, Employee timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of 
the Commission's Order on the basis that it contained factual errors regarding the 
activities of Employee when he was injured and legal errors with regard to the manner of 
its application of Allen and in its consideration of the undisputed issue of medical 
causation.39 
19. On January 14, 2008, the Commission entered its Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration, again reflecting its determination that Mr. Verburg experienced a 
"relatively routine event" and, as such, did not satisfy the test for legal causation under 
Allen. In the course of that Order, the Commission further set forth its medical 
conclusion that Employee's vision "going black" for a moment was "more reasonably 
related to Mr. Verburg's preexisting cervical problems,"40 a conclusion unsupported by 
any appropriate findings or any medical records or opinions. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The Commission erred in the manner it applied the Allen test for "legal 
causation" to the unexpected occurrence of Employee striking his head 
against the car door frame. 
38M 
39R.(vol. 1) at 00063 
40R. (vol. 1) at 00080 (Order is attached as Addendum 3 to this Brief) 
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Allen's "legal causation" test was intended to weed out aggravations of preexisting 
conditions which just happen to occur while an employee is at work but performing 
activities of normal everyday nonemployment life while at work. It requires that the 
employee be subjected to some exertion "greater than that undertaken in normal, everyday 
life." In applying that test to Employee's injury, the Commission erroneously determined 
that Employee's sudden, unexpected event of impacting his head on the car door frame 
was a "relatively routine event41" which was not uncommon to normal everyday life and, 
therefore, did not meet that "legal causation" test. 
People do, at times, suffer sudden unexpected events while engaged in "normal 
everyday" activities such as those referenced in Allen, such as falling while climbing a 
normal flight of stairs. However, such sudden unexpected events are not part of "normal" 
everyday life. Rather, they constitute "abnormal" events occurring during everyday life. 
With such a sudden unexpected event, there is a clear and direct relationship 
between that identifiable event and the resulting injury. Such instances are significantly 
different from the aggravations of preexisting conditions which Allen was trying to weed 
out, such as where an employee, while lifting a normal garbage can at work, feels a pain 
and claims an aggravation of a preexisting back injury as a result. 
Utah case law confirms that the test under Allen is not whether the type of exertion 
which caused the injury is unknown in nonemployment life but, rather, whether it exceeds 
exertion used in "normal everyday" nonemployment life. The uncontradicted evidence 
4]Supra, note 36 
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presented at the hearing demonstrates that the Employee met that higher standard of 
"legal cause." The facts surrounding the incident, as set forth in Employee's Statement of 
Facts,42 do not reflect a "relatively routine event" or a mere bump on the head. Rather, 
they reflect that there was a forceful impact as found by Judge Lima: 
The direct force Petitioner experienced moving from a standing to sitting 
position while propelling his body sideways with such a force, that when he 
struck his head his vision went black. . . The continuous movement of 
Petitioner's body and weight added more force to the impact of Petitioner's 
head and neck on the door jam which was unusual and extraordinary.43 
The Commission's conclusion that those facts failed to meet the "legal 
causation" test of Allen was erroneous, contrary to the law, and exceeded the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II. The Commission erred in basing its decision on findings and 
conclusions without adequate supported in the record. 
In supporting its conclusion that the facts of Employee's accident did not meet the 
"legal causation" test of'Allen, the Commission relied upon findings and conclusions 
which were not supported by the evidence and, rather, appear to have been improperly 
based solely on the Commission's assumptions without finding support in the record. 
The Commission concluded, "Mr. Verburg's exertion is more difficult to characterize 
because there is no way to determine the force with which he hit his head on his car 
door;" "The Commission is unconvinced that Mr. Verburg's testimony of his vision going 
42Statement of Facts Nos. 5-8 
43Supra, note 33 
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dark is a measure of impact," and "The Commission also notes the absence of any 
evidence of bruising or other marks from the impact."44 
In its subsequent Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, the Commission 
further concluded: 
(1) The fact that Mr. Verburg experienced an unusual reaction to that event 
- his vision 'going black' for a moment - does not change the nature or 
force of the impact itself, but is more reasonably related to Mr. Verburg's 
preexisting cervical problems."415 
Judge Lima's Findings of Fact, which were not disputed by the parties, established 
a significant factual basis upon which Judge Lima and the Commission could readily 
determine that the event in question involved an exertion which was not comparable to 
that encountered in "normal everyday nonemployment life," which was all that was 
required to meet the Allen test of "legal causation." 
There was no medical evidence or testimony in the record relating the fact of 
Employee's vision going black with his preexisting cervical problems. Even if there had 
been such a relationship established in the medical record, it would not change the fact 
that it was the unusual exertion of that impact which was the cause of his vision going 
black. 
Not only was there no evidence in the records concerning the existence or non-
existence of such bruising or marks, but the Employee did not see a doctor until the first 
4A[Supra, note 36 
^ Supra, note 40 
-15-
part of July, long enough after the June 17 incident for such marks to have significantly 
decreased or disappeared. 
The Commission reflects an inconsistent approach to "legal causation" by refusing 
to consider the Employee's vision going black as reflecting the force of the impact while 
implying that bruising or other marks would have been considered for that purpose, 
without any explanation of why they assumed bruises would better support the amount of 
force of that impact more than Employee's vision going black. 
The Commission's reliance upon these unsupported assumptions and inconsistent 
approaches to determining the force of the impact, were contrary to the Commission's 
obligation to liberally construe and apply the Act to provide coverage and to resolve any 
doubt respecting the right to compensation in favor of an injured employee and reflect 
that the Commission exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN THE MANNER IT APPLIED THE ALLEN 
TEST FOR "LEGAL CAUSATION" TO THE UNEXPECTED 
OCCURRENCE OF EMPLOYEE STRIKING HIS HEAD AGAINST 
THE CAR DOOR FRAME. 
Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1999) provides the basic statutory outline for 
compensability of injuries to employees as follows: 
(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of 
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and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
[benefits] 
Prior to Allen, the Utah Courts had adopted an "unusual exertion" rule with regard 
to the aggravation of preexisting injuries. That rule basically examined the work which 
the employee was performing at the time of the injury and whether the exertion was 
unusual to his normal employment activities. In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court 
extensively examined the problems with the "unusual exertion" rule and recognized that it 
created serious problems, among which was that an employee whose job entailed lifting 
heavy loads was not protected while lifting, while another employee lifting the same 
loads, who did not normally perform such lifting, was protected. Relying extensively on 
Professor Larson's46 insight into the unworkability of the "unusual exertion" standard, as 
well as the "inconsistent and confused approach" demonstrated by a chronological 
reading of the prior Utah cases utilizing that standard, the Court concluded: 
Because we find the present use of the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful 
and our prior precedent inconsistent, we take this opportunity to examine an 
alternative causation analysis that may better meet the objectives of the 
workers' compensation laws. We are mindful that the key question in 
determining causation is whether, given this body and this exertion, the 
exertion in fact contributed to the injury.47 
With that caveat, the Court went on to explain: 
Just because a person suffers a preexisting condition, he or she is not 
disqualified from obtaining compensation. Our cases make clear that "the 
aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing condition must show that the 
46Larson, Workers' Compensation, §38.62, at 7-162 (1986) 
A1
 Supra, note 1 at 24 (emphasis added) 
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employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he 
already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This additional 
element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater 
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra exertion serves 
to offset the preexisting condition of the employee as a likely cause of the 
injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal 
risk rather than exertions at work.48 
The Court then adopted the two-part test, which has come to be referred to as the 
uAllen Test," to be applied to weed out aggravations of preexisting conditions which just 
happen to occur while an employee is performing "normal" exertions of "everyday 
nonemployment life" while at work. It requires that, in addition to establishing the 
"medical cause" of the injury, the employee must establish the "legal cause." To meet that 
higher standard, the employee's body must have been subjected to some exertion "greater 
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life." To help clarify what type of activities 
would be considered as those undertaken in "normal everyday life, " the Court cited a 
number of examples, namely, "taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying 
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest 
height, and climbing the stairs in buildings."49 
There is no doubt but that people do, at times, suffer sudden unexpected events 
while they are engaged in any number of "normal" activities of "everyday 
nonemployment life." They slip while carrying full garbage cans to the street, they are 
injured when jacks slip while they are changing flat tires, they collide with other objects 
A%Supra, note 1 at 25 (emphasis added) 
49Supra, note 1 at 26 
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while driving their automobiles, they fall while climbing a normal flight of stairs and, as 
in this case, they bang their heads into a car door frames while entering cars. However, 
while such sudden unexpected events certainly occur, they are not part of''normal, 
everyday life." Rather, they constitute "abnormal" events occurring during "everyday 
life." 
The Allen Court's examples included only incidents which one encounters in 
''normal everyday life" and which involved unexpected results, rather than sudden 
unexpected events. We submit that it was no coincidence that the Court did not include 
in its list any sudden, unexpected events, such as automobile collisions, falls while 
climbing stairs, or bangs to the head on car door frames. After all, the Court's stated 
purpose in creating the new test was to weed out aggravations of preexisting conditions 
which just happened to occur while the employee was at work, performing "normal" 
exertions of "everyday nonemployment life." 
The Allen test was not intended to preclude employees from recovering for 
injuries received in a sudden unexpected event occurring at work, merely because they 
could have been involved someday in a similar type of sudden unexpected event in their 
"everyday nonemployment life." Such an interpretation would unreasonably bar 
recoveries by a vast number, if not a majority, of the employees injured at work since, as 
previously reflected, many of the sudden unexpected events at work could as readily have 
occurred during the employee's "everyday nonemployment life." However, nothing in 
Allen reflects that the Court intended that the mere fact that the sudden unexpected event 
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could have occurred as readily away from work as at work should bar a recovery for 
aggravation of a preexisting condition arising from such an event. 
The Court's concern in Allen was with incidents where the preexisting condition 
just happened to become symptomatic at the time an employee was performing some 
activity for the employer. As the Court noted, the "key question" which the "'Allen Test" 
was created to determine, "[I]s whether, given this body and this exertion, the exertion in 
fact contributed to the injury.50 
With a sudden unexpected event such as falling while climbing a normal flight of 
stairs, being in an automobile collision, or banging one's head on a car door frame while 
at work, there is a clear and direct relationship between that identifiable incident and the 
resulting injury. Such an instance is significantly different from an incident where an 
employee, while lifting a garbage can at work feels a pain and claims an aggravation of a 
preexisting back injury as a result. 
Allen clearly did not bar employees from recovery for aggravation of a preexisting 
condition which occurs while performing normal activity of "everyday nonemployment 
life," when that activity is undertaken in such a manner that the exertion exceeds that 
which persons encounter in "normal everyday nonemployment life." The facts in Allen 
itself involved an employee who felt a sharp pain in his lower back while he was lifting a 
crate containing four to six gallons of milk (certainly less weight than a full garbage can) 
from the floor onto a cooler shelf about chest height. The Commission rejected the claim 
50Supra, note 1 at 24 
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for benefits because it did not meet the former ''unusual exertion" test. The Court 
explained that the employee was performing those actions repetitively and in an enclosed 
area and that it was reversing and remanding the Commission's decision for further 
determination, because: 
It is unclear from the record how many crates were moved by the claimant, 
the distance the crates were moved, the precise weight of the crates, and the 
size of the area in which the lifting and moving took place.51 
The Court explained that the higher standard of the "legal causation" test 
attempts to distinguish between injuries which: 
(a) coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in 
symptoms which appear during working hours without any enhancement 
from the workplace, and (b) those injuries which occur because some 
condition or exertion of employment increases the risk of injury which the 
worker normally faces in everyday life.52 
On a regular basis since Allen, compensation has been affirmed in preexisting 
injury cases where the employee was engaged in activities which were such as to fall 
within the category of activities of "normal everyday nonemployment life," but in a 
manner which did not constitute part of "normal everyday nonemployment life." Thus, 
compensation has been affirmed for the following: an employee cleaning food processing 
equipment with high pressure water hoses which were operated similar to a gas pumps, 
but on which the locks had recently broken so that the employee had to use continuous 
)]Supra, note 1 at 28 
)2Supra, note 1 at 25 
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force to hold them in the uon" position;53 a machinist performing tasks comparable to 
what he performed away from work, but in a repetitive manner different from what the 
average person encountered in everyday life;54 a carpenter cleaning six inch by ten foot 
steel fonns weighing 50 pounds while also tending a sump pump in an eight foot deep pit, 
which required him to jump down onto a four foot shelf then four feet into the hole, a 
total of eight times in thirty minute intervals;55 a stock room clerk who suffered back 
injuries with gradual onset of pain, while lifting and carrying tubs which weighed 15 to 
40 lbs each, depending on their contents, to a sorting area and stacking them, between 
thirty and thirty-six times a day;56and an employee at a care center who was assisting a 
one hundred and ninety pound patient to dress, holding the patient with one arm and 
reached around with the other to straighten his T-shirt.57 
This Court in Nyrehn5* further clarified the language of Allen. There, a stockroom 
clerk suffered back injuries with a gradual onset of pain, while lifting and carrying tubs 
which weighed 15 to 40 lbs each, depending on their contents, to a sorting area and 
stacking them, between thirty and thirty-six times a day. The ALJ found that the 
employee had failed to prove "legal causation" as required under Allen, but concluded 
53Stouffer Foods v. Industrial Comm X 801 P. 2d 179 (Utah App., 1990) 
^ Chase v. Industrial Comm 'n, 872 P. 2d 475 (Utah App., 1994) 
55Miera v. Industrial Comm % 728 P. 2d 1023 (Utah, 1986) 
56Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm X 800 P. 2d 330 (Utah App., 1990) 
51
 Richfield Care Center v. Utah Industrial Comm % 733 P. 2d 178 (Utah, 1987) 
5
*Supra, note 56 
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that the "Allen test" was unconstitutional, and awarded benefits. The Commission, upon 
Review, adopted the factual findings of the ALJ including the conclusion that the 
employee had failed to prove "legal causation" under the "Allen test" and5 therefore, 
reversed the award. 
That Court concluded that the Commission had improperly based its determination 
of a preexisting injury on pure assumption, but declared that failure was not fatal to the 
Commission's decision because the employee's exertions met even the higher standard of 
"legal cause." The Court, referring to the examples cited in Allen of everyday exertions, 
explained: 
While lifting a tub of merchandise weighing between 15 and 40 pounds 
once or twice could likewise fit into the list of examples above, lifting such 
a tub 30 to 36 times a day for two and a half months is not a typical 
nonemployment activity. The foregoing moderately strenuous activities 
which may not be considered unusual when performed once or twice may 
nevertheless amount to unusual exertion when performed repeatedly. 
Otherwise, garbage collectors, baggage handlers, auto mechanics, childcare 
providers, etc., would be barred by the foregoing examples.59 
The Court further explained: 
The test is not whether the type of exertion which caused the injury is 
unknown in nonemployment life, but rather whether the cumulative 
work-related exertion exceeds the normal level of exertion in 
nonemployment life.60 
Getting into a car, absent any sudden unexpected event, could certainly be 
classified as an exertion which employees would typically experience in everyday non-
}Supra, note 56 at 336 
'Id. 
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employment life. However, it cannot be said that striking one's head against the car door 
frame while getting into the car is a typical experience in "everyday nonemployment life/' 
any more than having a collision while driving the car would be. Sudden unexpected 
events such as those may well occur to numerous people in their everyday life, but that 
does not make them typical experiences in "everyday non-employment life." 
American Roofing v. Green61 came to this same conclusion. There, an employee 
was injured while attempting to unload a thirty pound bucket of debris over the bed of his 
truck bed. He was lifting it out of the truck bed when the bucket suddenly snagged on 
something and the employee felt a "lightning bolt" of pain in his back and legs. The 
Commission found the incident to be compensable, declaring that the weight of the 
bucket, the manner of lifting, and the fact that the bucket snagged, all combined to make 
the incident unusual or extraordinary under Allen, although the weight of the bucket alone 
would not have met "legal causation." This Court upheld the Commission's 
determination without imposing any requirement that there be some determination by the 
Commission of the precise amount of force involved when the bucket snagged. 
Employee has also become aware of Schreiber v. Labor Comm 'n,62 a 1999 
Memorandum Decision by this Court which, at first glance, appears to be a contrary 
decision. Employee recognizes that Memorandum Decisions are generally not considered 
61752 P. 2d 912 (Utah App., 1988) 
621999 UT App 376 (December 23, 1999), Judges Greenwood, Bench and Billings 
(For ease of access, a copy is attached as Addendum 4 to this Brief) 
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as precedent for anyone other than the specific parties involved in the case. However, 
Employee feels obligated to bring the case to the Court's attention because it did involve 
a sudden unexpected event in which an employee with a preexisting back condition was 
hit in the back with a rubber ball on the playground, and this Court upheld the 
Commission's determination of a failure to establish "legal cause." It is important to note, 
however, that, unlike the Commission's detemiination in Mr. Verburg's case, the 
Commission's determination in Schreiber that the force of the ball was "relatively minor, 
comparable to the jostling one frequently encounters in crowds," was supported by 
substantial evidence presented by the employer's biomechanical expert. This Court's 
decision upholding the Commission's determination in that case was based upon the 
existence of that substantial contrary evidence. No such contrary evidence appears in Mr. 
Verburg's case. 
Employee respectfully submits that the Commission applied the Allen test for 
"legal causation" with regard to Mr. Verburg's case in an inappropriate manner, as more 
fully reflected in Point II. Contrary to the Commission's declaration that, "Mr. Verburg's 
exertion is more difficult to characterize because there is no way to determine the force 
with which he hit his head on his car door,"64 the uncontradicted evidence was sufficient 
to establish that he had suffered an exertion sufficient to meet "legal cause." Striking his 
63See former Rule 4-508, Rules of Judicial Administration and Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 
UT 25, 44 P. 3d 734 (Utah, 2002) 
64Supra, note 36 
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head in the manner he did on the door frame was an exertion beyond that "normally" 
confronted in "everyday nonemployment life." The undisputed facts surrounding the 
incident, as more fully set forth in this Employee's Statement of Facts65 do not reflect a 
"relatively routine event" or a mere bump on the head. Rather, they reflect that 
Employee's body was in motion from a standing to sitting position and being thrust 
sideways toward the seat. It was with the full force of that momentum that he struck his 
head halfway between the crown and the top of his head and ear on the door frame. At 
impact, his vision went black for a few seconds and he just sat in the car. The incident 
was significantly different from the mere bump on the head he had received previously on 
the bottom of a garage door, when he did not have to stop what he was doing and his 
vision did not go black.66 That undisputed evidence was fully in keeping with Judge 
Lima's determination that: 
The direct force Petitioner experienced moving from a standing to sitting 
position while propelling his body sideways with such a force, that when he 
struck his head his vision went black. . . The continuous movement of 
Petitioner's body and weight added more force to the impact of Petitioner's 
head and neck on the door jam which was unusual and extraordinary.67 
The undisputed evidence in this case reasonably demonstrates that the the impact 
to Employee's head with the door frame was of sufficient force to take it beyond the 
realm of exertions undertaken in "normal everyday nonemployment life." He was not 
65Statement of Facts No. 5 - 8 
66Supra, note 21 
61
 Supra, note 33 
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injured by the "normal" exertion of "everyday nonemployment life" in getting into his car 
but, rather, by the "abnormal" sudden unexpected event of impacting his head against the 
car door frame while doing so, a distinction not unlike that between a person injured 
while climbing a normal flight of stairs as opposed to a person falling while doing so. In 
finding to the contrary, the Commission failed to meet its obligation to "liberally construe 
and apply the Act to provide coverage" and to resolve "any doubt respecting the right to 
compensation in favor of the injured employee."68 
The Commission's conclusion that the undisputed facts of this case failed to meet 
Allen's "legal causation" test was erroneous, contrary to the law, and exceeded the bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN BASING ITS DECISION ON 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT ADEQUATE 
SUPPORT IN THE RECORD. 
In supporting its conclusion that the facts of Employee's accident did not meet the 
"legal causation" test of Allen, the Commission relied upon findings and conclusions 
without adequate support in the record and which, rather, appear to have been based upon 
the Commission's assumptions. 
The Commission, in its Order Reversing ALJ's Decision and Denying Benefits, 
concluded, "Mr. Verburg's exertion is more difficult to characterize because there is no 
way to determine the force with which he hit his head on his car door . . . The 
6%Supra, note 3 
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Commission is unconvinced that Mr. Verburg's testimony of his vision going dark is a 
measure of impact."69 
In its subsequent Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, the Commission 
further concluded: 
(1) The fact that Mr. Verburg experienced an unusual reaction to that event 
- his vision 'going black' for a moment - does not change the nature or 
force of the impact itself, but is more reasonably related to Mr. Verburg's 
preexisting cervical problems."70 
Judge Lima's Findings of Fact, which were not disputed by the parties,71 
established a significant factual basis upon which Judge Lima and the Commission could 
readily determine that the event in question involved an exertion which was not 
comparable to that encountered in ''normal everyday nonemployment life," as was done in 
American Roofing J2 Whether or not the precise quantum of force involved could be 
determined was of no import. The Findings, with adequate support in the record, 
determined that the impact was sufficient to meet the Allen test of "legal causation." 
There was also no medical evidence, testimony, or other adequate support in the 
record linking the fact of Employee's vision going black with any of his preexisting 
cervical problems. Even if there had been such a relationship established in the medical 
]
 Supra, note 36 
]Supra, note 40 
R. (vol. 1) at 00038 - 00040; Statement of Facts No. 14 
1
 Supra, note 61 
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records, it would not change the fact that it was the unusual exertion of that impact which 
was the cause of his vision going black. 
The Commission also improperly supported its denial of benefits with its 
conclusion that/The Commission also notes the absence of any evidence of bruising or 
other marks form the impact."73 None of the medical records reflected any absence of 
bruising or other marks and there was no other evidence in the records concerning the 
existence or non-existence of such items. It is also important to note that Employee did 
not see a doctor until the first part of July, long enough after the accident that any such 
bruising or marks would have significantly decreased or disappeared. Thus, these 
unsupported conclusions again appear to have been based merely upon the Commission's 
assumptions. 
The Commission must have some evidentiary foundation upon which they base 
their material findings, not just their assumptions. In Nyrehn, the Court explained: 
Such material findings, however, may not be implied. In order for us to 
meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, the findings must be 
'"sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
[citing cases]. The failure of a trial court to make adequate findings is 
reversible error. Id. Likewise, the failure of an agency to make adequate 
findings of fact on material issues renders its findings 'arbitrary and 
capricious' unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted and capable of 
only one conclusion."74 
T
" Supra, note 36 
1A
 Supra, note 56 at 335 
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In Nyrehn, because the employee's actions met even the higher "legal causation" 
standard, the Court explained that the Commission's failure to have adequate findings 
supporting that assumption was harmless. However, in Mr. Verburg's case, that failure 
severely prejudiced his right to compensation. 
The Commission's determinations on these issues further reflect a significant 
inconsistency in its approach to determining whether Employee met the "legal causation" 
test under Allen. While denying that Employee's vision going black supports a 
determination of the significant force of the impact, and ignoring Employee's comparison 
of the minor impact with the garage door, the Commission implies that "bruising or other 
marks" would have supported a determination of a more forceful impact. However, no 
indication is made as to why bruises would support the significant force of that impact 
more than Employee's vision going black, nor is there any reference in the record that the 
incident did not, in fact, result in bruising or other marks. Rather, the record is simply 
silent on that issue. 
These determinations were made contrary to the Commission's obligation to 
liberally construe and apply the Act to provide coverage and to resolve any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation in favor of an injured employee. The Commission's 
reliance upon its unsupported assumptions and inconsistent approaches to determining the 
force of the impact was erroneous, contrary to the law, and exceeded the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Commission's conclusion that Employee failed to meet Allen's 'legal 
causation" requirement was contrary7 to the uncontradicted evidence at the Hearing before 
Judge Lima. In reaching its conclusion, the Commission applied Allen in an erroneous 
manner, improperly based findings upon its own assumptions and without adequate 
support in the record, and failed to comply with its obligation to liberally construe and 
apply the Act to provide coverage and to resolve any doubt respecting the right to 
compensation in favor of an injured employee. We respectfully submit that the Court 
should reverse the Commission's November 19, 2007, Order Reversing ALJ's Decision 
and Denying Benefits and reinstate the Order of Judge Lima dated October 6, 2005, 
which determined that Employee had met the higher 'legal causation'' standard or, in the 
alternative, remand the case to the Commission for further consideration in light of the 
Court's determinations herein. 
Respectfully submitted this E> day of May, 2008. 
By: I 
Gary E. Atkin, SB# 0144 
K. DawnAtkin, SB#6471 
Attorneys for Employee, Michael Verburg 
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MICHAEL VERBURG, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
OGDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 04-1130 
Judge Lorrie Lima 
HEARING: Room 336, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
on June 7. 2005 8:30 a.m. The hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice 
of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Louie Lima, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The petitioner, Michael Verburg, was present and represented by Dawn 
Atkin, Esq. 
The respondent, Ogden City Police Department, was represented by 
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 13, 2004, Michael Verburg ("Petitioner") filed an Application for 
Hearing and claimed entitlement to medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary 
total, temporary partial and permanent partial disability compensation, travel expenses, interest 
and other - wage rate and clothing allowance of $44.00. Petitioner's claim for workers 
compensation benefits arose out of two industrial accidents on March 24, 2004, and June 17, 
2004. 
On December 28, 2004, the Ogden City Police Department ("Respondent") filed an 
Answer and denied that Petitioner sustained compensable accidents due to a lack of legal and 
medical nexus. 
At the hearing, Petitioner withdrew his claim regarding the date of injury, March 24, 
2004, based on an independent medical evaluation conducted by Dr. Terry Brown. Petitioner 
also withdrew his claimed entitlement to temporary partial and permanent partial compensation. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Employment and Compensation. 
Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a Community Services Officer. His hourly 
wage was $13.91 and he worked 40 hours per week. In addition, Petitioner received a clothing 
allowance of $44.00 every two weeks. The clothing allowance was provided to Petitioner to pay 
the costs of dry cleaning his uniform. The clothing allowance was added to his regular wage in 
his paychecks. Petitioner reported to the Internal Revenue Sendee that he paid taxes on the 
allowance. 
Petitioner was married and he had one dependent child. 
Respondent paid the following workers compensation benefits to Petitioner: (1) 
temporary total compensation from July 6, 2004, to December 10, 2004, at a weekly benefit rate 
of $376.00 [$13.91 X 40 = $556.50 X 2/3 = $371.12 plus $5.00 for spouse = $376.00] and (2) 
medical expenses through December 10, 2004. At the hearing, Respondent conceded that 
Petitioner's compensation rate should have included an additional $5.00 for one dependent child. 
2. Industrial Accident. 
On April 19, 2004, Petitioner had an anterior cervical diskectomy at C4-5 with 
decompression of the nerve root, an anterior cervical fusion at C4-5 for degenerative disc disease 
at C4-5. Medical Records Exhibit ("MRE"), p. 54. An impression of Petitioner's cervical spine 
CT scan, on April 5, 2004, revealed multiple levels of degenerative disc disease superimposed on 
post-op changes significant at C4-5, C3-4 followed by C5-6 and C7-T1. MRE, p. 44. Following 
surgery, Petitioner was released to regular duty on June 8, 2004. Petitioner felt better than before 
the surgery and he was happy with the result. 
On June 17, 2004, at the conclusion of Petitioner's work shift, he was in the process of 
sitting down into the driver's seat of his police vehicle when he hit his head on the door jamb. 
Petitioner hit the top right side of his head above his ear. Petitioner's vision went black for a 
second but he did not lose consciousness. Petitioner collected his personal items from the police 
vehicle and he went home. Approximately one hour after arriving home, Petitioner's neck, head 
and shoulders began to feel stiff and hurt. His pain progressively worsened. 
On June 29, 2004, Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Brent Felix. MRE, p. 59. X-rays of 
Petitioner's cervical spine showed a stable fusion. 
On July 2, 2005, Petitioner was evaluated by the Ogden Clinic for neck pain. MRE, p. 
138. On July 5, 2004, Petitioner was instructed by Respondent to present for an evaluation at 
McKay-Dee Hospital Center. MRE, p. 1. The diagnosis was muscle strain of Petitioner's neck 
and he was informed to return to work in four days and follow-up with his treating physician. 
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On July 13, 2004, Dr. Felix noted that Petitioner experienced pain at the C7-T1 area as he 
did prior to surgery. MRE, p. 59. Dr. Felix released Petitioner from work for four weeks. 
On August 10, 2004, Dr. Felix noted that Petitioner continued to experience pam in the 
C7-T1 area. MRE, p. 61. Dr. Felix further noted that Petitioner reported that he did well 
following the surgery until he struck his head on the car door. Dr. Felix prescribed physical 
therapy and pam management for Petitioner. He released Petitioner to return to work with a 
restriction to not lift more than 10 pounds. Petitioner received physical therapy three times 
weekly for two months. MRE, p. 71. On August 13, and 27, 2004, Dr. Matthew Pingree 
evaluated Petitioner for left neck and shoulder pain increased at least 50% since June 17, 2004. 
MRE, pp. 179-183. Dr. Pingree prescribed pain medication, a TENS trial and physical therapy. 
He released Petitioner from work. 
On October 1, 2004, an impression of Petitioner's cervical spine revealed a satisfactory 
post-op cervical spine. MRE, p. 52. On October 18, 2004, Petitioner reported an increase in 
neck pain and headaches. MRE, p. 69. On October 26, and November 12, 2004, Dr. Pingree 
requested a MRI scan of Petitioner's cervical spine. He noted that Petitioner was on family 
leave. MRE. pp. 191-194. 
On December 30, 2004, Dr. Pingree released Petitioner to return to work on January 7, 
2005, with lifting restrictions of 50 pounds and no bending, twisting. MRE, p. 194A. On 
January 10, 2005, Petitioner returned to work at Respondent. 
On March 7 and 21, 2005, Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Kevin Gardner for persistent 
neck pain. MRE, pp. 154 and 157. He was prescribed pain medication. 
On June 2, 2005, Dr. Brown issued an independent medical evaluation of Petitioner. 
MRE, pp. 226-232. Dr. Brown noted that Petitioner suffered from a preexisting condition of his 
cervical spine that contributed to his complaints. Dr. Brown opined a medical nexus between 
Petitioner's injury on June 17, 2004. and his complaints of increased cervical spine pain. Dr. 
Brown further opined that Petitioner was medically stable but had ongoing significant pain. Dr. 
Brown noted that the medical treatment Petitioner received after June 17, 2004, was medically 
necessary due to the industrial injury. Dr. Brown further noted that future treatment of 
Petitioner's condition would include pain management for significant neck pain and no surgery. 
Currently, Petitioner is prescribed a Duragesic patch, Percocet for break through pain and 
Advil for his cervical pain. 
3. Prior Cervical Spine History. 
On November 19, 2002, an impression of Petitioner's cervical spine revealed multi-level 
disk disease, the most pronounced at C5-6, broad-based herniation on the anterior thecal sac and 
distortion and impingement on the left anterior aspect of the cervical, and broad based bulging 
and hernaition at C6-7. MRE, pp. 18-19. On December 10, 2002, Petitioner had an anterior 
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discectomy with microsurgical decompression and internal plate fixation at C5-6 and C-67. 
MRE,p. 25. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Employment and Compensation. 
At all times relevant to this claim Respondent employed Petitioner as a Community 
Sendees Officer. 
Section 34A-2-409 of the Workers' Compensation Act bases the amount of compensation 
to be awarded an injured employee on his average weekly wage at the time of his industrial 
injury. In Craig Burnham Produce v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1983), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the Legislature granted generous powers to the Industrial 
Commission to determine what may be included in "wages" to enable the Commission to 
"fashion a method that would, "' based on the facts presented, fairly determine the employee's 
average weekly wage.'" See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-409(2). 
hi Blake Stevens Constr. v. Henion, 697 P.2d (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that "[b]efore any part of such allowances or reimbursements can be considered as 
part of the employee's "wages" there should be some showing that the payments are more than 
sufficient to reimburse the employee for the work-related expenses so that in effect the excess 
can be considered as extra compensation to the workman for his sendees performed." (quoting 
Moorehead v. Industrial Commission, 495 P.2d 866 (Ariz. 1972). Therefore, under that analysis, 
the Court in Blake held that, under the real economic gain rule, the decedent's subsistence 
allowance could not be included in the average weekly wage without a finding, based on the 
facts, that the allowance constituted real economic gain. 
hi the instant case, Petitioner received a biweekly allowance for the cost of dry cleaning 
his work uniform. The extra benefit provided by Respondent was directly related to meeting a 
special expense due to Petitioner's employment and will cease upon Petitioner's separation from 
his employment. However, Petitioner has not shown that the clothing allowance, in part or in its 
entirety, was more than sufficient to reimburse him for the work-related expense and thereby 
realized a real economic gain. Accordingly, Petitioner's clothing allowance cannot be included 
in his average weekly wage. 
Based on the foregoing, at the time of the accident in issue, Petitioner was married with 
one dependent child. Petitioner's appropriate rate for temporary total compensation was 381.00 
[$13.91 X 40 - $556.50 X 2/3 - $371.12 plus $10.00 for spouse and dependent child - $381.12]. 
2. Legal Causation. 
In order to recover workers' compensation benefits, an employee must prove that he was 
injured "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment." Utah Code 
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Ann. §34A-2-401. Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) requires: (1) that 
the injury be "'by accident,"1 and (2) that "'there be a causal connection between the injury and 
the employment."' Allen then requires a claimant to show both medical and legal causation. In 
the instant case, the medical nexus and "by accident" components are not at issue. All that is 
pending is whether Petitioner earned his burden of proving legal causation. 
In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court held that a claimant with a preexisting non-industrial 
condition that contributed to his current medical condition must meet a more stringent test for 
legal causation: the claimant must show that his work-related activities exceeded the exertions of 
his normal everyday life. The undisputed medical evidence, including Respondents' 
independent medical examiner, demonstrates that Petitioner suffered from a preexisting cervical 
spine condition that contributed to his injury of June 17, 2004. Consequently, Petitioner must 
satisfy the more stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation. 
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the direct force Petitioner 
experienced moving from a standing to sitting position while propelling his body sideways with 
such a force, that when he struck his head his vision went black, was not a typical exertion 
experienced by men and women in modern non-employment life. While getting into a motor 
vehicle is typical of modem non-employment life, such exertion does not typically involve the 
combination of factors presented here. Specifically, the continuous movement of Petitioner's 
body and weight added more force to the impact of Petitioner's head and neck on the door jam 
which was unusual or extraordinary and satisfies the requirement of legal causation. This extra 
exertion served to offset the preexisting condition of Petitioner as a likely cause of the injury. 
Moreover, how Petitioner felt before and after the June 17, 2004, evidences the degree of force 
exerted by Petitioner. Following surgery in April 2004, Petitioner felt better than before the 
surgery and he was happy with the result. However, following June 17, 2004, Petitioner 
experienced significantly increased pain in his cervical spine. 
Finally, in concluding that that facts of Petitioner's injury satisfied the higher legal 
causation standard, it is the duty of the Labor Commission to construe the Workers' 
Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage when statutory terms reasonably 
admit of such a construction. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990). 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's exertion at the time of his accident was sufficient to 
satisfy the applicable standard of legal causation. Consequently, Petitioner's injury arose out of 
his employment at Respondent is compensable under §34A-2-401 of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
3. Travel Expenses. 
Petitioner did not submit any travel mileage documentation. 
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ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Respondents shall pay to Petitioner temporary total 
compensation at the weekly rate of $381.00 from December 11, 2004, to January 10, 2005, or 
4.42 weeks, for a total of $1,684.02. The amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT FURTHER ORDERED: Respondents shall pay to Petitioner temporary total 
compensation of an additional $5.00 (for an additional dependent child) per week from July 6, 
2004, to December 10, 2004, or 22.57 weeks, for a total of $112.85. The amount is accrued, due 
and payable in a lump sum plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. Respondents are 
credited a total of $8,433.68 of temporary total compensation already paid to Petitioner from July 
6, 2004, to December 10, 2004. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: Respondents shall pay the statutory attorneys' fees of 
$359.37, plus twenty percent (20%) of the interest awarded herein, directly to Dawn Atkin, Esq. 
pursuant to Utah Code Aim. §34A-l-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4. That 
amount shall be deducted from Petitioner's award and sent directly to the office of Ms. Atkin. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: Respondents shall pay all medical expenses, including 
any out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Petitioner, reasonably related to his industrial accident 
reasonably related to Petitioner's industrial accident pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-418(l), 
and the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission, and any travel 
allowances hereinafter incurred pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus 
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, under Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah 
Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-213. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: Petitioner's claim for temporary total and permanent 
partial compensation are dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED October 6, 2005. 
Lorrie 
Administrative Law Judge 
LiffisP' J ) 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on October 6, 2005, to the persons/parties at the 
following addresses: 
K Dawn Atkin Esq 
H U E Brickyard Rd Ste 206 
Salt Lake City UT 84106 
Sharon J Eblen Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
UT^H-LABOR COMPASSION 
Clerk, Adjudication Division 
POBox 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
MICHAEL VERBURG, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
OGDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, i 
Respondent. 
ORDER REVERSING 
ALJ'S DECISION AND 
DENYING BENEFITS 
Case No. 04-1130 
The Ogden City Police Department (uOCPD" hereafter) asks the Utah Labor Commission to 
review Administrative Law Judge Lima's award of benefits to Michael Verburg under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 63-46b-12 and § 34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. Verburg claims workers' compensation benefits for a cervical injur}7 allegedly resulting 
from an accident that occurred on June 17, 2004. as he was working as a police officer for OCPD. 
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Lima awarded benefits to Mr. Verburg. 
In challenging Judge Lima's decision. OCPD argues that Mr. Verburg's work accident does 
not satisfy the more stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation that is applicable to Mr. 
Verburg's claim. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The parties do not dispute Judge Lima's findings of fact. As material to the issue now before 
the Commission, those facts are as follows. 
Mr. Verburg has a degenerative cervical condition that is unrelated to his work at OCPD. He 
underwent spinal surgery during 2002 and again during April 2004. He returned to work at OCPD 
on June 8,2004. On June 17.2004, as he was entering his police car and sitting down in the driver's 
seat, he hit the right side of his head on the top of the car door. His vision went dark for a moment, 
but he did not lose consciousness. He then went on with his work activities. He experienced pain 
and stiffness in his neck, head and shoulders about an hour later. 
Beginning on June 29, 2004. Mr. Verburg received medical care for his neck pain and was 
restricted from work. He new seeks workers' compensation benefits for this aggravation of his 
preexisting neck condition. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to workers injured by accident 
"arising out of and in the course of employment. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401. To qualify for 
benefits under the foregoing standard, an injured worker must establish, among other elements, that 
his or her work was the "legal cause" of the injury in question. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). In the case now' before the Commission, the question is whether Mr. 
Verburg's accident—hitting the side of his head on a car frame—satisfies this requirement of "legal 
causation." 
In Allen, Ibid, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the context in which the requirement of 
"legal causation" is applied. 
Whether an injury arose out of or in the course of employment is difficult to 
determine where the employee brings to the workplace a personal element of risk 
such as a preexisting condition. Just because a person suffers a preexisting condition, 
he or she is not disqualified from obtaining compensation. Our cases make clear that 
"the aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an industrial accident is 
compensable . . . ." (Citation omitted.) To meet the legal causation requirement, a 
claimant with a preexisting condition must show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of 
his condition. This additional element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by 
an exertion greater than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. 
In its subsequent decision in Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d I079, 
1082 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court described the test for legal causation as follows: 
Under Allen, an usual or ordinary exertion, so long as it is an activity connected with 
the employee's duties, will suffice to show legal cause. However, if the claimant 
suffers from a pre-existing condition, then he or she must show that the 
employment activity involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and 
above the "usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life.1' The 
requirement of "unusual or extraordinary' exertion" is designed to screen out those 
injuries that result from a personal condition which the worker brings to the job, 
rather than from exertions required of the employee in the workplace. (Citations 
omitted; emphasis added.) 
The parties agree that, because Mr. Verburg suffered from a preexisting condition that 
contributed to the cervical problems for which he now claims benefits, Mr. Verburg must satisfy the 
more stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation. Thus, Mr. Verburg must establish that the 
work accident of June 17, 2004, constituted an "unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the 
usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial 
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Commission, Ibid. Some of the examples cited in Allen as typical of nonemployment exertion are 
"taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel changing a flat tire on 
an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height, and climbing the stairs in buildings." 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Allen, the Commission has considered legal causation 
in the context of many types of exertion. Usually, the exertion can be easily classified as "unusual or 
extraordinary'" and compensable, or "usual and ordinary'* and noncompensable. Mr. Verburg "s 
exertion is more difficult to characterize because there is no way to determine the force with which 
he hit his head on his car door. And. while it is not uncommon to hit one's head on a car door frame, 
a car trunk, or an open cabinet, it is also possible to imagine circumstances where such a blow is 
sufficiently forceful to constitute an unusual or extraordinary exertion. 
In light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has carefully considered the 
available information regarding Mr. Verburg's work accident on June 17. 2004. It appears to have 
been a relatively routine event in which he bumped his head as he slid into the drivers seat. The 
Commission is unconvinced that Mr. Verburg's testimony of his vision going dark is a measure of 
the force of impact. The Commission also notes the absence of any evidence of bruising or other 
marks from the impact. In summary, the Commission finds that the evidence does not establish that 
the exertion involved in Mr. Verburg's accident was unusual or extraordinary. Because Mr. Verburg 
has not satisfied the more stringent test for legal causation that is applicable to his claim, the 
Commission concludes that Mr. Verburg is not entitled to workers* compensation benefits. 
ORDER 
The Commission grants OCPD's motion for review, sets aside Judge Lima's award of 
benefits to Mr. Verburg. and dismisses Mr. Verburg's claim for benefits with prejudice. It is so 
ordered. 
/(A 
Dated this / / day of November, 2007. 
Sherrie H&yashi 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received b} the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, an}' part} may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. An} such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Reversing ALTs Decision and Denying Benefits 
in the matter of Michael Verburg, Case No. 04-1130, was mailed first class postage prepaid this / f 
day of November. 2007, to the following: 
Michael Verburg 
2211 N 4425 W 
Plain City UT 84404 
Ogden City Police Department 
2186 Lincoln Ave 
Ogden UT 84401 
K. Dawn Atkin, Esq. 
H U E Brickyard Rd Ste 206 
Salt Lake City UT 84106 
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq. 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
MICHAEL VERBURG, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
OGDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Respondent. 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 04-1130 
Michael Verburg asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision deir\ ing 
Mr. Verburg's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act": Title 34A, 
Chapter 2. Utah Code Annotated). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 63-46b-13. 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. Verburg. a police officer with Ogden Cit} Police Department ("OCPD"). seeks workers' 
compensation benefits for a cervical injury allegedly caused or aggravated when he hit his head on 
the door frame as he was getting into the driver" s seat of his police car. After an evidentiary hearing. 
Judge Lima awarded benefits to Mr. Verburg. OCPD then requested Commission review. On 
November 19.2007. the Commission reversed Judge Lima's award and denied Mr. Verburg*s claim 
for benefits on the grounds his accident was not the "legal cause" of his cervical injur}7. 
Mr. Verburg now asks the Commission to reconsider its decision. Mr. Verburg argues that 
the Commission failed to appreciate the force of the impact that occurred as he hit his head on the 
car's door frame. Mr. Verburg contends that this force is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of legal 
causation. 
DISCUSSION 
The Commission has reviewed the evidential*} record in this matter, with particular attention 
to the accident that occurred as Mr. Verburg was getting into his car. Based on the evidence, the 
Commission reaffirms its finding that Mr. Verburg experienced a relatively routine event in which he 
bumped his head as he slid into the driver's seat. The fact that Mr Verburg experienced an unusual 
reaction to that event—his vision "going black1" for a moment—does not change the nature or force 
of the impact itself, but is more reasonably related to Mr. Verburg* s preexisting cervical problems. 
The Commission's previous decision has explained in some detail the standard for legal 
causation that is applicable to Mr. Verburg's claim. That explanation will not be repeated, except to 
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note that the Commission has again considered Mr. Verburg's arguments but again concludes that 
Mr. Verburg's accident does not satisfy the test for legal causation that is applicable to Mr. 
Verburg's claim. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms its previous decision in this matter and denies Mr. Verburg's 
request for reconsideration. It is so ordered. 
it Dated this IT day of January, 2008. 
C - L 
Sherrie Hayashi 
Utah L a^bor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review 
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a cop) of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the matter 
of Michael Verburg, Case No. 04-1130, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this )j day of 
January, 2008. to the following: 
Michael Verburg 
221 I N 4425 W 
Plain Citj UT 84404 
Ogden City Police Department 
2186 Lincoln Ave 
Ogden UT 84401 
K Dawn Atkin Esq 
H U E Briclcyard Rd Ste 206 
Salt Lake City UT 84106 
Sharon J Eblen Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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Kristine S. Schreiber, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Labor Commission and Jordan 
School District, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
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Attorneys: Robert C. Olsen and Theodore E. Kanell, Salt Lake 
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Commission 
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Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Billings. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Kristine S. Schreiber, a playground supervisor employed by 
the Jordan School District, appeals the Labor Commission's denial 
of workers* compensation benefits. Schreiber had a history of 
back problems, including back surgery. The Labor Commission 
determined that an accident that occurred on a playground when a 
rubber ball struck Schreiber in the back was not the legal cause 
of her injury. 
In order to show legal cause, "a claimant with a preexisting 
[medical] condition must show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in 
everyday life." Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 25 
(Utah 1986). To establish a work-related nexus of legal 
causation under Allen, a claimant with a preexisting condition 
must prove that the accident in question resulted from "unusual 
or extraordinary exertion." Id. at 26. 
The Legislature has explicitly granted broad discretion to 
the Labor Commission to "determine the facts and apply the law in 
this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers." Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997). When discretion is delegated to an 
agency by statute, its interpretation or application of law 
receives intermediate review under the Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act (UAPA). See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) 
(1997); Morton Int'1, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 
587-89 (Utah 1991).x Thus, we must determine "whether the Labor 
Commission's decision exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 
P.2d 240, 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Johnson Bros. 
Constr. v. Labor Comm'n, 967 P.2d 1258, 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998); Caporoz v. Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). 
We cannot say that the Labor Commission's determination was 
unreasonable. The Labor Commission determined that the direct 
force of the ball was "relatively minor, comparable to the 
jostling one frequently encounters in crowds," and that 
Schreiber's surprised reaction "does not appear to be different 
from the everyday event of tripping on a rug or a [sic] uneven 
sidewalk." The validity of these comparisons was supported by 
substantial evidence presented by the School District's 
biomechanical expert during the hearing. 
Tripping without falling, and being startled in the process, 
can reasonably be considered a part of ordinary nonemployment 
life. The Labor Commission found that Schreiber's accident 
involved a comparable level of exertion--a finding of fact 
supported by the record--and thus reasonably concluded that her 
accident was not the legal cause of her injury. We therefore 
affirm the Labor Commission's decision. 
£ \d£&jWI- SU&Hfri) Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
-z*+iu 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
!2L*at irt 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. It is important to note that § 34A-1-301(1997), formerly 
§ 35-1-16 (1994), was enacted in 1994, well before Schreiber's 
1996 accident. See Act of Indus. Comm'n Auth., ch. 207 §1, 1994 
Utah Laws 972. Appellant, in arguing that we must review the 
Commission's decision for correctness, relies primarily on cases 
arising before this express grant of discretion was given to the 
agency by statute. 
